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Abstract Previous studies on tool using have shown that
presenting subjects with certain modiWcations in the experi-
mental setup can substantially improve their performance.
However, procedural modiWcations (e.g. trap table task)
may not only remove task constraints but also simplify the
problem conceptually. The goal of this study was to design
a variation of the trap-table that was functionally equivalent
to the trap-tube task. In this new task, the subjects had to
decide where to insert the tool and in which direction the
reward should be pushed. We also administered a trap-tube
task that allowed animals to push or rake the reward with
the tool to compare the subjects’ performance on both
tasks. We used a larger sample of subjects than in previous
studies and from all the four species of great apes (Gorilla
gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, and Pongo pygma-
eus). The results showed that apes performed better in the
trap-platform task than in the trap-tube task. Subjects
solved the tube task faster than in previous studies and they
also preferred to rake in rather than to push the reward out.
There was no correlation in the level of performance
between both tasks, and no indication of interspecies diVer-
ences. These data are consistent with the idea that apes may
possess some speciWc causal knowledge of traps but may
lack the ability to establish analogical relations between
functional equivalent tasks.
Keywords Tool-use · Action constraints · Primates · 
Causal knowledge · Analogy
Introduction
Tool using is an indirect means of achieving a goal by caus-
ally relating objects to one another (Tomasello and Call
1997). Although a variety of animals are capable of using
tools to solve problems (e.g., Beck 1980; Natale et al. 1988;
Tomasello and Call 1997; Chappell and Kacelnik 2002;
Tebbich and Bshary 2004; Helme et al. 2006), their degree
of understanding of the problem features (tools, obstacles
and rewards) and the causal relationships between those
features is still an unresolved question. One task that has
received substantial research attention is the trap-tube task
(Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994). Capuchin monkeys
were presented with a plexiglass tube from which they had
to extract a reward without pushing it inside a trap situated
in the centre of the tube. Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994)
found that after 120 trials only one of four subjects solved
the task by pushing the reward away from the trap. How-
ever, this subject persisted in her strategy during the control
condition, in which the trap was inverted 180 degrees, ren-
dering it non-functional. The authors concluded that this
subject learnt to insert the tool into the side farthest away
from the reward without understanding the causal relations
between the trap and the reward.
Limongelli et al. (1995) presented the trap-tube task to
Wve chimpanzees. However, this task diVered from the one
presented to the capuchins in the control condition.
Limongelli et al. (1995) changed the ineVective trap from
the centre to a functional trap placed closer to one end of
the tube opening. In some cases the trap was located on the
right side of the tube, while in others the opposite arrangement
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was used. The reward was positioned in the centre of the
tube. Two chimpanzees solved the problem and, interest-
ingly, they also avoided the trap in the control condition.
The variations made on the tube controlled for the distant-
based procedural rule by omitting the inverted the trap
control condition. However, this does not rule out the possi-
bility that the chimpanzees could have solved the task by
applying the procedural rule “push the reward away from
the trap”. Povinelli (2000) replicated this experiment
including the inverted trap control condition; but his results
did not diVer much from those obtained with the original
task. Only one chimpanzee avoided the trap during the
experimental condition; however, this subject also behaved
as if the trap was functional in the control condition. There-
fore, Povinelli (2000) suggested that the chimpanzee did
not understand the causal nature of the task, but used the
procedural rule. Silva et al. (2005) have proposed that if
there is no cost in avoiding a non-functional trap, it is mis-
leading to assume that an animal that does this has under-
stood nothing about causality. In fact, they found that adult
humans do not avoid the ineVective trap. Recently, Seed
et al. (2006) tested eight rooks (Corvus frugileus) with a
modiWed version of the trap tube, the two-trap tube task.
Subjects were presented with two tubes containing two
traps along each tube: a functional and a non-functional
trap. In one of these tubes, the reward had to be dragged
over the top of the non-functional trap, whereas in the other
tube, the reward was supposed to fall through the functional
trap and recuperate from below. Therefore, by incorporat-
ing a non-functional ‘trap’ they circumvented the problem
of using the inverted trap as a control task. Their results
showed that seven rooks rapidly mastered the problem and
transferred the solution to a visually and conceptually simi-
lar task; however, six of them were unable to transfer this
knowledge to conceptually similar but visually diVerent
tasks. On the other hand, Tebbich et al. (2007) presented
the original trap-tube task and two diVerent two-trap tube
transfer tasks to seven rooks. They found that three rooks
solved the trap-tube problem; however, none of these rooks
passed the transfer tasks (Tebbich et al. 2007). The authors
concluded that, even though rooks “are capable of sophisti-
cated physical cognition”, they probably do not understand
the unobservable causal properties of the trap problems.
It has been argued that part of the diYculty of the trap-
tube may not be due to a lack of understanding of its fea-
tures, but to the intervention of other variables that could
mask their performance. The diameter of the tube and the
tool force the animals to push the reward out. This strategy
might increase the diYculty of the problem, at least for
non-human primates, since pushing the reward away
increases the distance between them and the food (Guil-
laume and Meyerson 1930; Köhler 1925). In line with this
observation, Tebbich and Bshary (2004) presented six
woodpecker Wnches (Cactospiza pallida) with a modiWed
trap tube problem. In this task, birds were allowed to either
push away or rake in the reward out of the tube, the latter
being the action that birds preferred to use. Nevertheless,
only one subject solved the task after 100 trials. Addition-
ally, this subject inserted the tool on each side multiple
times in successful trials, suggesting that it was not antic-
ipating the eVect that its actions would have on the reward
in relation to the trap. What this result indicates is that the
subject did not understand the causal relation between the
tool and the trap. Mulcahy and Call (2006) also presented a
modiWed trap-tube task to great apes in which the subjects
could choose between raking or pushing the reward out.
This study revealed two interesting results. First, although
only three of the ten subjects tested were above chance,
they solved the task much faster than any other animals
tested before. More important, their performance in the
inverted trap condition ruled out the possibility that sub-
jects were simply using the position of the trap as a cue to
decide where to insert the tool. Second, animals preferred
to rake in rather than to push the reward out of the tube.
Mulcahy and Call (2006) suggested that forcing the sub-
jects to get the reward by pushing it out might have caused
the poor performance reported in previous trap-tube experi-
ments.
Povinelli (2000) also attempted to simplify the trap-tube
problem by administering an equivalent trap task with a
diVerent setup. Six chimpanzees were faced with a table
divided into two sections. A hole, functioning as a trap, was
cut in one of these sections. A rectangle of the same dimen-
sions, placed in a position similar to that of the hole, was
painted in the other section. Subjects were given a choice of
pulling one of two rakes, which had been placed on the
table, until they got the reward. The results indicated that
overall, chimpanzees showed no preference for pulling
from the rake behind the fake trap. Povinelli (2000) con-
cluded that chimpanzees had little understanding of the
trap, or the eVect it had on the reward. Subsequent studies
carried out with capuchins and gibbons using a similar par-
adigm also concluded that subjects did not have a total
comprehension of the elements of the problem, but that
they might have learnt certain associative rules to solve the
problem (Fujita et al. 2003; Cunningham et al. 2006). On
the other hand, Santos et al. (2006) presented tamarins and
vervet monkeys with a battery of raking tasks in which the
properties of the tools and the properties of the substrate
were altered. The authors found that only vervet monkeys
selected the appropriate tool accordingly to its properties
and avoided pulling food over a trap, in a performance
comparable to that of chimpanzees on such tasks (Povinelli
2000). These results suggest that sensitivity to the relation
between the functional aspects of a tool and a substrate are
present in non-tool-using primates.Anim Cogn (2008) 11:423–430  425
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Girndt et al. (in press) have suggested that the traditional
trap-table setup used by Povinelli (2000) possesses some
constraints that might have favoured the poor performance
of the apes. Girndt et al. (in press) tested the four species of
great apes on the original trap-table setup, but also on one
in which they varied the type of trap (two tables vs. one
table), the position (pre-positioned vs. non-positioned) and
the number (one vs. two) of presented tools, the type of tool
(rake vs. stick) and the reinforcement regime (non-diVeren-
tially vs. diVerentially reinforcement). Their results demon-
strated that the four species of great apes avoided the trap
(also in the Wrst trial) when they were allowed to insert the
tool in one of the two sections of the table but not when the
tools were pre-positioned on the table. Therefore, the cru-
cial variable in explaining the discrepancy between their
diVerent results and those found by Povinelli (2000)
appears to be the position of the tool on the platform. The
authors concluded that apes might have possessed causal
knowledge about traps but that pre-positioning the tools on
the table may have concealed this knowledge.
Although associative explanations cannot be ruled out in
some of the studies carried out with non-human primates,
recent studies on great apes have provided some evidence
that is inconsistent with a purely associative account (Mulc-
ahy and Call 2006; Girndt et al. in press). Some studies
have reported successful Wrst trial performance, while oth-
ers have shown that certain modiWcations of the experimen-
tal procedure can substantially improve the subjects’
performance revealing capabilities not previously reported.
However, procedural modiWcations may also simplify the
problem conceptually. In particular, the trap-table is not
comparable to the trap-tube because there were two
rewards in the trap-table and subjects just had to select the
alternative without a trap in front. Therefore, the Wrst goal
of this study was to design a variation of the trap-table
(platform task) that was more similar to the original trap-
tube task since subjects had to decide where to insert the
tool and then displace the reward towards one side. We
tested representatives of all the great ape species excluding
humans. The subjects faced an inverted U-shaped platform
with a reward placed on its centre and a trap to one side of
the reward. The solution consisted of using the tool to
displace the reward towards the side of the platform
without the trap to bring it within reach down the arm of the
U-shaped platform.
The second goal of this study was to compare the great
apes’ performance on the platform task to a modiWed version
of the trap-tube task in which both raking and pushing the
reward out were possible (e.g. Mulcahy and Call 2006). This
comparison allowed us to assess both the relative diYculty of
each task and to correlate their scores to investigate whether
subjects were capable of transferring the solution across
tasks. We predicted that subjects would perform better in the
trap-platform than the trap-tube because subjects had per-
formed better in a task in which the trap was presented on a
platform compared to a tube (chimpanzees: Povinelli 2000;
all great apes: Mulcahy and Call 2006; Girndt et al. in press).
We also expect the subjects to perform better in the trap-plat-
form because they had performed better in a modiWed version
of the table task (Girndt et al. in press) than in a modiWed ver-
sion of the tube task (Mulcahy and Call 2006). Based on a
previous study (Mulcahy and Call 2006), we also predicted
that subjects would prefer to rake rather than to push the
reward out of the tube. Moreover, since subjects faced no
restrictions on the actions that they could use, that is either
pushing or raking the reward were possible, we predicted that
the subjects would perform better in the current tube task
than in previous studies (e.g. Limongelli et al., 1995; Povi-
nelli  2000). Finally, we expected a positive correlation
between the performances in both tasks because they were
conceived as functionally equivalent.
Materials and methods
Subjects
Six orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), six chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), Wve bonobos (Pan paniscus) and three gorillas
(Gorilla gorilla) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate
Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo participated in this
experiment (see Table 1). There were 15 females and 5
males. All apes were mother-reared except six individuals
(see Table 1). All subjects except Kila had participated in a
variety of cognitive tests and some of them included tasks
involving tools and traps (see Table 1). All subjects lived in
social groups of various sizes, with access to indoor and
outdoor areas that were furnished with natural vegetation,
climbing structures, and enrichment devices to foster
extractive foraging activity during the day that included the
use of tools. Subjects were individually tested (except one
of the orangutans) in their indoor cages and were not
deprived either of food or water.
Apparatus
There were two apparatuses: the trap platform and the trap
tube. The trap platform was a U-shaped platform, which
consisted of a 70-cm wide £ 31 cm long plastic platform
surrounded on three sides by a 2-cm border that prevented
the reward from falling oV the platform. The front part of
the platform was cut to create a trap (8 cm wide £ 15 cm
long) and to prevent subjects from getting the reward from
its starting position (see Fig. 1). There was a border on part
of the front side of the platform to prevent the reward from
falling into empty space.426 Anim Cogn (2008) 11:423–430
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The trap tube followed the design by Mulcahy and Call
(2006), which was a modiWed version of the one used by
Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994). For the current study
we used two tubes. Each consisted of a 40 cm long £ 5c m
diameter plexiglass tube with an oV-centre opaque trap
(8 cm wide £ 15 cm long) located in its bottom part. A
small hole was drilled in both traps, so when the reward
dropped into it, the experimenter could take the reward
away. One tube had the trap on the right side (8 cm from
the right end of the tube) and the other had the trap on the
left side (8 cm from the left end of the tube). The distance
between the reward and the trap was identical in both tasks:
8 cm. Both tubes had a small hole (1 cm diameter) drilled
in the middle of their back wall to allow the experimenter to
bait them.
The tool consisted of a straight wooden dowel (0.5 cm
diameter) with a length of 50 cm in the trap platform condi-
tion and 40 cm in the trap tube condition.
Procedure
There were two phases: pretest and test. In the pretest, sub-
jects were allowed to retrieve the reward from an apparatus
(platform and tube) without traps to see if they were proW-
cient at using tools. If they retrieved the reward with
smooth movements, they moved to the next phase. Subjects
received one 10-trial session except the gorilla Gorgo that
received two sessions to ensure that he could manipulate
the tool proWciently in the trap tube condition. In the test,
subjects received two tasks:
Platform
The experimenter placed the trap-platform outside the cage
against the mesh and deposited half of a grape (or a banana
slice for the orang-utan Bimbo) on a predetermined spot in
the centre of the platform equidistant to the retrieval areas
(Fig. 1). The experimenter gave the tool to the subject
through the mesh at a point located just above the reward so
that no side bias was induced. To retrieve the reward the
Table 1 Name, gender, age, rearing history, and previous experience
of the subjects in tool using in trap tasks
1 trap-tube task, (1F subjects failed the task, Mulcahy and Call 2006);
2 tube task (Seed et al. unpublished data); 3 trap table (Girndt et al. in
press)
Subject Gender Age 
(months) 
Rearing 
history
Previous 
experience 
in trap tasks
Chimpanzee
Fraukje F 360 Nursery raised 2,3
Jahaga F 162 Mother raised 3
FiW F 156 Mother raised 1,2,3
Trudi F 156 Mother raised 3
Sandra F 156 Mother raised 2
Pia F 78 Mother raised 3
Bonobo
Joey M 282 Nursery raised 1F
Limbuko M 126 Nursery raised 3
Kuno M 114 Nursery raised 3
Ulindi F 150 Mother raised 1F
Yasa F 120 Unknown 3
Orangután
Bimbo M 306 Nursery raised 1F,3
Dunja F 396 Nursery raised 3
Pini F 216 Mother raised 1F,3
Dokana F 198 Mother raised 1F,3
Padana F 102 Mother raised 3
Kila F 72 Mother raised –
Gorilla
Gorgo M 300 Nursery raised 3
Ndiki F 342 Mother raised 3
Viringika F 132 Mother raised 1F,3
Fig. 1 Experimental setup for 
the trap-platform (a) and the 
trap-tube tasks (b)Anim Cogn (2008) 11:423–430  427
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subject had to take the tool, insert it through the mesh and
move the reward away from the trap.
Tube
The experimenter placed both trap-tubes inside the cage
fastened to the mesh with metal braces. The tubes were
located one above the other with their respective traps
facing opposite sides (Fig. 1). The location of the trap
(left-right) for each tube changed across sessions, but
remained the same during a session. The experimenter
placed the reward inside one of the tubes through the
baiting hole and gave the tool to the subject through the
mesh right above the apparatus. In order to get the
reward, subjects had to insert the stick through one of the
sides of the tube and rake or push the reward away from
the trap.
In both tasks, the trial ended after the subject retrieved
the reward or when the reward fell into the trap. Subjects
received both tasks sequentially, with half of the subjects
receiving the platform Wrst and half of the subjects
receiving it second. All subjects participated in three 12-
trial sessions per condition (72 trials in total) except
Gorgo that participated in a total of 66 trials. He stopped
cooperating after 30 trials with the trap tube. The posi-
tion of the trap or which tube was baited was counterbal-
anced across trials within a session so that it appeared the
same number of times to the left and to the right of the
subject.
Data scoring and analysis
We videotaped all trials. For each trial we scored whether
they retrieved the reward. Additionally and only for the
trap-tube condition, we scored whether they inserted the
tool from one side of the tube only and the technique that
they used to displace the reward. We distinguished four
techniques:
Rake: displace the reward toward the tool’s insertion
point.
Push: displace the reward away from the tool’s inser-
tion point.
Mixed: insert the tool from one side and pull it out from
the other side.
Wiggle: shake the tool once it is inside the tube.
We calculated the percentage of trials in which subjects (1)
obtained the reward, (2) used each of the above-mentioned
techniques, and (3) inserted the tool from only one end of
the tube. We conducted parametric tests whenever the data
met the assumptions for its use. Unless it was otherwise
indicated, all tests were two-tailed. Those for which we had
a priori predictions were one-tailed.
Results
Success
Figure 2 presents the percentage of correct trials for each
condition across sessions. A mixed model ANOVA with
condition and session as within-subject factors and species
as between-subject factor indicated that subjects performed
better in the platform compared to the tube condition
(F1,16 =3 . 4 6 ,   P=0.04, one-tailed) and improved their per-
formance across sessions (F2,16 = 5.99, P=0.006). How-
ever, there was no evidence of improvement in the
subjects’ performance within sessions for the tube condi-
tion (Wrst session: t19 =1 . 1 6 ,  P=0.26; second session:
tube:  t19 = 0.25,  P=0.81; third session: t18 = 0.59,
P=0.56). Subjects’ performance did not change within the
Wrst two sessions for the platform condition, although it did
improve within the third session (Wrst session: t19 = 1.64,
P=0.12; second session: t19 = 0.27,  P=0.79; third ses-
sion: t19 =2 . 6 5 ,   P=0.016). No other factors or interactions
were signiWcant. A re-analysis with species excluded con-
Wrmed these results (condition: F1,16 =5 . 0 4 ,  P=0.019,
one-tailed; session: F2,16 =7 . 5 8 ,  P=0.004). Overall, sub-
jects were above chance in all sessions for both conditions
(t19>3 . 0 5 ,   P<0.01 in all cases) except the second session
of the tube condition (t19 =1 . 7 7 ,   P = 0.092). However, sub-
jects were not above chance in the Wrst trial of the platform
(2 =3 . 2 0 ,  df =1 ,  P=0.074, 14/20 correct) or tube condi-
tions (2 = 0.80, df =1 ,   P=0.37, 12/20 correct). There was
no evidence that subjects who had previous experience with
trap-tube tasks performed better than subjects who did not
have that experience (t18 =0 . 3 5 ,  P=0.37, one-tailed; see
Table 1). In addition, the number of trap tasks to which the
subject had been exposed had no signiWcant eVect on the
scores of the trap-tube task (r = 0.33, P=0.077, one-tailed)
and trap-platform task (r = 0.27, P=0.12, one-tailed).
Table 2 presents the subjects’ individual performance in
each task. Five subjects solved both tasks, seven solved the
platform task only, three solved the tube task only and Wve
Fig. 2 Percentage of correct trials for each task across sessions
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solved neither task. There was no relationship in levels of
performance between both tasks (r =0 . 1 3 ,   P=0.57,
n = 20), that is, subjects who solved one task did not neces-
sarily solve the other. Table 2 also presents the speed at
which subjects reached above chance performance. There
were no signiWcant diVerences between the platform and
the tube task (Wilcoxon test: z =1 . 8 5 ,   P=0.065).
Retrieval tube technique
Figure 3 shows the percentage of trials in which subjects
used each technique to retrieve the reward from the tube.
Subjects signiWcantly preferred to rake than push the
reward out (Wilcoxon test: z = 1.98, P=0.024, one-tailed).
Moreover, subjects also preferred the raking technique
compared to the mixed (Wilcoxon test: z =2 . 5 6 ,   P=0.01)
and the wiggle techniques (Wilcoxon test z =3 . 6 8 ,
P < 0.001). We also analysed the strategies used during the
pretest. Subjects signiWcantly preferred to rake (mean =
64.5%, SEM = 8.7) than to push the reward out (z = 2.84,
P=0.004, mean = 18%, SEM = 5.2) or use one of the
combined techniques (mixed: z = ¡.8, P=0.005, mean =
15%, SEM = 5.5; mixed z = 3.76, P < 0.001, mean = 1.5%,
SEM = 1.5).
Most of the subjects, attempting to retrieve the reward,
used single tool insertions. Only in 14.2% (SEM = 2.6) of the
trials did subjects insert the tool into both sides of the tube.
Discussion
Apes performed better in the trap platform task than in the
trap tube task. Twelve subjects out of 20 solved the platform
problem, whereas only eight were able to solve the trap tube
task. Subjects tended to be faster solving the platform prob-
lem than the tube problem: four apes solved the platform
task within the Wrst 12 trials, whereas only one individual
solved the tube task within the Wrst 12 trials. We found no
evidence of inter-speciWc diVerences. There was no correla-
tion in the level of performance between the two tasks. Our
subjects solved the tube task faster (and in greater numbers)
than in previous studies and they also preferred to rake in
rather than to push the reward out. Previous experience with
trap tasks did not inXuence the subjects’ performance. More-
over, in successful trials, subjects normally used single tool
insertions, supporting the idea that they could have antici-
pated the solution of the problem.
The poor performance of the subjects on the trap tasks
reported in some of the previous studies (Visalberghi and
Limongelli  1994; Povinelli 2000; Fujita et al. 2003) con-
trasts with the better performance observed in the current
study. As predicted, subjects performed better in the plat-
form task than in the tube task and, moreover, they were
above chance in the Wrst session (four subjects were above
chance individually). One reason that could explain the bet-
ter performance in the platform task is that, as Povinelli
(2000) proposed, this is a less demanding task because indi-
viduals do not need to mentally represent the side into which
Table 2 Percentage of correct responses in both tasks, signiWcance
levels on binomial tests and session in which subjects are above chance
Subject Task
Platform Tube
Correct 
(%)
P Session Correct 
(%)
P Session 
Chimpanzee
Fraukje 52.77 0.868 – 52.77 0.868 –
Jahaga 83.33 <0.001 2 58.33 0.405 –
FiW 94.44 <0.001 1 77.77 <0.001 3
Trudi 100 <0.001 1 58.33 0.405 –
Sandra 47.22 0.868 – 77.77 0.001 3
Pia 69.44 0.029 3 91.66 <0.001 1
Bonobo
Joey 88.88 <0.001 2 55.55 0.618 –
Limbuko 97.22 <0.001 1 47.22 0.868 –
Kuno 75 0.004 3 69.44 0.029 3
Ulindi 55.55 0.618 – 77.77 0.001 2
Yasa 63.88 0.132 – 55.55 0.618 –
Orangutan
Bimbo 75 0.004 2 55.55 0.618 –
Dunja 75 0.004 3 58.33 0.405 –
Pini 77.77 0.001 2 69.44 0.029 3
Dokana 97.22 <0.001 1 69.44 0.029 3
Padana 80.55 <0.001 2 58.33 0.405 –
Kila 44.44 0.618 – 27.77 0.989 –
Gorilla
Gorgo 50 1 – 50 1 –
Ndiki 55.55 0.618 – 47.22 0.868 –
Viringika 52.77 0.868 – 69.44 0.029 3
Fig. 3 Percentage of trials in which subjects used each technique to
retrieve the reward in the trap-tube task
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they could insert the tool, only the consequence of their
actions over the reward. However, in our platform task, sub-
jects had to insert the tool before they used it, yet their group
performance was above chance in the Wrst session.
Another possibility is that the trap platform aVords the
use of actions such as raking a reward for which apes show
a great predisposition, clearly greater than pushing the
reward away (e.g. Guillaume and Meyerson 1930; Köhler
1925). Indeed, Mulcahy and Call (2006) found that great
apes prefer to rake rather than push a reward out of the
tube. The current study conWrmed this Wnding. Addition-
ally, the platform setup may oVer subjects a more intuitive
type of problem because the trap is located between the
reward and the subject. In contrast, the trap in the tube
setup is located in front of the subject but next to the
reward. Therefore, the spatial dispositions of the problem
elements (including the subject) paired with the subject’s
preferences for using certain actions may increase the diY-
culty of the tube tasks compared to platform/table tasks.
Given the challenge posed by the tube task, it is remark-
able that 40% of the subjects (8/20) in the current study
were above chance after 36 trials. Only one orangutan out
of 22 apes tested in previous studies had succeeded after 36
trials (Limongelli et al. 1995; Povinelli 2000; Mulcahy and
Call 2006). What can explain these substantial diVerences
among studies? We found no evidence that the amount of
experience with trap tasks had an eVect on the performance
in the current study. In fact, performing well with the Wrst
task in the current study had no eVect on the performance in
the second one. Mulcahy and Call (2006) suggested that
allowing subjects to rake (as opposed to push) the reward
out of the tube lifted a task constraint that masked the sub-
jects’ knowledge about the task. Note that individuals in the
current study also preferred to rake the reward—an action
that primates and woodpecker Wnches spontaneously use to
get out-of-reach rewards (Köhler 1925; Guillaume and
Meyerson 1930; Tebbich and Bshary 2004).
Although this explanation could account for the diVer-
ences between the initial studies (Limongelli et al. 1995;
Povinelli 2000) and subsequent ones (Mulcahy and Call
2006, the present one), it does not account for the diVerence
between the Mulcahy and Call’s (2006) study and the cur-
rent study because raking was possible in both studies.
However, there were other diVerences between these two
studies. First, unlike Mulcahy and Call’s setup in which the
tube was positioned between two cages, we placed the trap
tubes in one cage. Mulcahy and Call (2006) suggested that
the strong preference by some subjects for moving to one
cage might have confounded the selection of the correct
location. By placing both tubes in one cage we might have
avoided this problem. Second, the length of the tube and of
the tool could have inXuenced the performance of the sub-
jects. In this study, the tube and the tool were much shorter
than in Mulcahy and Call’s study (tube 40 vs. 95 cm,
respectively; tool: 20 vs. 120 cm, respectively). Providing
subjects with a longer tool to be inserted into a longer tube
may be disadvantageous to their performance. Individuals
might have an inaccurate control over the reward, which
increases the likelihood of pushing it into the trap.
Third, presenting two trap tubes simultaneously instead
of one may have allowed subjects to learn which particular
movements produced the reward in each tube. Note that
although the placement of the tubes changed across ses-
sions, it remained the same during each session. Addition-
ally, the double-tube setup may have allowed subjects to
directly compare the two trap orientations—something that
was not possible with the single-tube setup. An increased
contrast between alternatives may have facilitated the task
by calling attention to the diVerent trap orientations. Such
information would be particularly valuable if subjects
tended to associate an action with an object and had diY-
culty switching actions depending on the orientation of the
object.
Although gorillas appeared to perform worse than other
apes in the current tasks, we found no statistically signiW-
cant diVerences between species. However, our reduced
sample size may explain this to some extent. Incidentally,
the lack of species diVerences in the current study suggests
that orangutans are not more proWcient than other apes in
this task, a possibility that Mulcahy and Call (2006) had
considered. However, future studies with larger samples of
gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees and orangutans are neces-
sary to conWrm the lack of interespeciWc diVerences.
We found no relation between the performance in the
platform and tube tasks. Perhaps administering subjects a
larger number of trials may have revealed a positive rela-
tion between tasks. In any case, the lack of association
between tasks was unexpected because we considered them
as diVerent instantiations of the same problem. The reasons
for this outcome remain unclear and we can only speculate
at this point. One possibility is that subjects had no causal
knowledge about the task but had associated certain actions
with success in a particular task without any understanding
of the relations between the elements of the problem. How-
ever, this explanation does not Wt well with some of the
recent data on other trap-tube tasks in apes (Girndt et al., in
press; Mulcahy and Call 2006; Seed 2007) and corvids
(Seed et al. 2006) that may suggest some understanding of
the trap properties. Another possibility is that apes pos-
sessed some causal knowledge but it could not be expressed
because it was tied to particular actions as it has been
shown in previous studies (e.g. Girndt et al. in press). For
instance, Mulcahy and Call (2006) found that those sub-
jects, who solved the trap tube when pushing and raking
were possible, failed when they could only push the reward
out of the tube.430 Anim Cogn (2008) 11:423–430
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Alternatively, actions per se may not have been the prob-
lem but the subjects’ causal knowledge may be tied to spe-
ciWc tasks. This means that apes may have diYculty in
establishing an analogy between functionally equivalent
tasks (Gentner and Markman 1997; Gentner 2002), or they
may lack a general understanding of the principles that gov-
ern all kinds of traps. For instance, subjects may compre-
hend the relation between the reward, the stick, and the hole
in the tube task, but they do not see that the relation
between those elements is equivalent (and governed by
similar principles) to the relations between the reward, the
stick, and the hole on the platform task. Future research is
required to test the validity of these various hypotheses.
In conclusion, subjects solved a trap problem on a plat-
form closer to the original trap-tube task. Additionally, sub-
jects performed better in the current trap-tube task than in
the previous studies. We propose that the spatial disposition
of the problem as well as the actions required to solve the
problem were instrumental in producing these results.
These results taken together with other recent studies sug-
gest that nonhuman great apes may know more about the
relation between traps, rewards and tools than previously
thought. This knowledge, however, may be task speciWc
and may not easily permeate across tasks, perhaps due to a
limitation in apes’ analogical reasoning abilities. Future
studies will be needed to conWrm the extent of apes’ causal
knowledge in various problems and to explore further their
analogical capabilities.
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